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ABSTRACT 
 
 The dynamics of international economic competition have far-reaching policy implications for both 
developing and developed countries. Established industrial and trade policy regimes in most countries are 
under tremendous strain, and this applies even to the dynamic Newly Industrialising Economies (NIEs). The 
outward-oriented development strategies of the Asian NIEs, which once seemed unbeatable, have run up 
against protectionist barriers in the developed countries, and increasingly, against competitive pressures from 
other up and coming developing countries. Governments in these NIEs have had to re-examine accustomed 
policies and strategies, and search for alternative strategies and programs, in order to re-position their 
economies for the future. 
 
This paper is weighted towards the experiences of one of the Asian NIEs - Singapore - and its search for new 
and innovative strategies to meet the challenges in the international economic environment. This paper sets 
out Singapore's strategic response to these fundamental changes in the international economic arena, and 
offers some insights on the strategic thrusts which the government has "engineered" to gear up the city-state 
for an enhanced role in the global economy. A brief historical backdrop serves to introduce these 
developments. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Singapore’s Economic Development (1959-1989) 
 
Singapore attained internal self-government in 1959, inheriting a slew of severe problems; not just economical, 
but social and political as well. The most immediate were economic problems. The Singapore government’s 
initial strategy to deal with them, working on the assumption that there would eventually be a ‘Malaysian 
common market’, was to launch an industrialisation program to attract manufacturing industries to Singapore, 
emphasizing import substitution, instead of export promotion. 
 
Singapore's separation from Malaysia in 1965, however, created an urgent need for precisely such export 
promotion. Without the Malaysian economic hinterland, industrial policies, of necessity, shifted towards 
creation of exports to generate income. The further constraint of a small domestic market, coupled with the 
impending announcement of a complete British military withdrawal by 1968, led the government to adopt an 
export-oriented (EOI), labour-intensive industrialization strategy, spearheaded by foreign investments (Mirza 
1986; Pang, 1987; Rodan, 1989; Huff, 1995; Murray and Pereira, 1995; Peebles and Wilson, 1996). 
 
To achieve this, the government adopted an interventionist approach. Strong political, social and economic 
measures were introduced to ensure a favourable investment climate for the foreign investment-led EOI 
strategy. Institutions were reorganised, tax incentives revised and expanded, development of industrial estates 
accelerated, labour legislation introduced to improve industrial relations, the educational system restructured 
to emphasize technical education, and industrial training programs expanded; radical changes made possible 
by constant government attention (Rodan, 1989; Regnier, 1991; Huff, 1995; Low, 1998; Yeung, 1998; 
Pereira, 2000). 
  
This switch in industrialisation strategy was accompanied, fortuitously, by a marked improvement in the 
international economy, with rapid expansion in world trade and in multinational investments in export 
platforms. The EOI strategy, thus, proved remarkably successful; full employment was achieved by the early 
1970s. This created pressures for wage increases, which initially sparked plans for a new development 
strategy to shift the economy from low-skill, low value-added, labour-intensive economic activities to higher 
value-added activities; this initial effort at economic restructuring, however, was effectively shelved following 
the oil crisis and world recession of the mid-1970s. Exports, and labour-intensive investments, remained the 
driving force behind Singapore’s economic growth throughout the decade. 
 
By the late 1970s, however, Singapore’s export-led economic growth had led it to a virtual impasse. Rapid 
growth had brought to the fore deep-seated strains in the internal economic structure, most notably labour 
shortages due to Singapore’s small population, and prospects of declining productivity growth. There were 
also serious concerns over the deterioration in the international economic environment, particularly concerning 
increasing degrees of protectionism in the developed countries against its traditional, labour-intensive 
manufactured exports. And even in those same labour-intensive exports, Singapore was beginning to lose the 
comparative advantage to other countries with cheaper and more abundant labour, and with steadily 
improving technology and quality of production. These numerous external and internal constraints on 
Singapore's further economic growth prompted the government to embark on its much-publicised economic 
restructuring program in 1979 (Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI), 1981). 
 
The magnitude and complexity of the restructuring process, as well as the short time frame in which it had to 
be implemented, led the government to adopt some aggressive – even ruthless – measures. A 3-year wage-
correction policy designed to phase out low-skill, labour-intensive activities spearheaded a host of other 
deliberate restructuring initiatives. New fiscal incentives were introduced to encourage industries to shift into 
technologically more sophisticated activities; R&D efforts were actively promoted; manpower developer 
programs were stepped up – and at the same time, the same incentives that had previously encouraged the 
growth of lower-end industries were being withdrawn (Yeoh, 1988). This carrot and stick approach worked 
remarkably in the early 1980s, and the target of 8-10% growth per annum set in the Economic Development 
Plan was achieved. 
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This was not to last; the Singapore economy stumbled into a severe recession in 1985. An Economic 
Committee was formed to examine the causes of the recession, identify new growth areas and chart new 
directions for the Singapore economy (MTI, 1986). Remedies were promptly proposed and undertaken 
(Singapore Economic Development Board (SEDB, 1988). The economy turned around; GDP growth rates 
rebounded above 9% by 1987. However, it was clear that, for Singapore, growth could no longer be sustained 
through just more and faster production of yesteryear’s products. Singapore had to look to new economic 
products and services to sustain growth into the 1990s and beyond. Singapore businesses had to either move 
into higher value-added segments of established industries, or move into more sophisticated industries and 
services which would require higher skills and technology, and justify its higher cost structure. Competing on 
quantity was no longer possible; quality became the new focus for Singapore (Krause, 1987; Lim et al, 1988). 
 
 
CHALLENGES IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 
 
A broad vision was laid for Singapore in 1984, by Mr Goh Chok Tong, then Singapore's Prime Minister to 
become a developed nation by 1999 (Vision `99). This strategic intent was clearly articulated in the 1986 
Economic Committee Report: 
 
 "By the 1990s, we must aim to become a developed nation. We must aspire to be as good as 
any developed country in terms of education and skill level, range and sophistication of our 
economic activities, capital invested per worker and productivity per worker." (MTI, 1986). 
 
New strategies and initiatives were developed to work towards this aim. The main ideas were set out in the 
document, Gearing Up for an Enhanced Role in the Global Economy (SEDB, 1988). The 1990 Global 
Strategies Conference added new dimensions to these deliberations (SEDB, 1990). 
 
Strategic Economic Plan (1991) 
 
Vision `99 underwent an evolution. Singapore's strategic intent was now to join the first league of developed 
nations within the next 30 to 40 years, as spelt out in the document, The Strategic Economic Plan (SEP) - 
Towards a Developed Nation (MTI, 1991). The SEP also set out a series of ‘strategic thrusts’ to upgrade 
Singapore's capabilities, so as to realise this enhanced vision. Strategic thrusts 1 to 4 were formulated to 
strengthen Singapore's economic fundamentals; strategic thrusts 5 and 6, to nurture the development of 
industry clusters and business niches; and the last two strategic thrusts, to enhance Singapore's economic 
resilience amidst uncertainties in the international environment. An overview of these initiatives is set out in 
Table 1. 
 
Strengthening Economic Fundamentals 
Arguably the main thrust of the SEP, encapsulated in the first four strategic initiatives, was devoted to the 
reinforcement of Singapore’s basic economic resources – which, for the most part, referred to the island-
state’s human resources. Strategic Thrust 1 was devoted to the enhancement of human resources through a 
multi-pronged approach involving the upgrading of the existing workforce, expanding education programmes 
in tertiary institutions and, in a move that would set the course of immigration policy for years to come, 
increasing the talent pool through selective immigration as required. Strategic Thrust 2 was to promote 
national teamwork between labour, business, and government, and aimed to do so through both the formation 
of a administrative-level Economic Panel to create a forum for discussion on major issues, and the promotion 
of mega-conferences to facilitate better understanding between the different sectors. Strategic Thrust 3, 
centred on the enhancement of Singapore’s infrastructure, particularly its soft infrastructure, in which the city-
state was lacking at the time, so as to better operate in the global marketplace and tap on global resources, 
technology, and talent. The ‘soft infrastructure’ was upgraded through attention to human resource and 
cultural development; through the development of networks-of-excellence, or resource/expertise hubs; and 
cultivating the perception of the world as Singapore’s hinterland. More significant, perhaps, was Strategic 
Thrust 4, which aimed to create a conducive climate for innovation; although the measures proposed, namely, 
modification to training and education systems to encourage initiative, relaxing of regulations, and recognition 
of creativity through public commendations, were later found to be less than effective, this was a clear sign of 
the Singapore government’s recognition of innovation as a necessary quality. 
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Developing of Industry Clusters and Business Niches 
Another aim of the SEP was to enhance Singapore’s long-term economic viability through the development of 
world-class industry clusters, targeting specific niches due to the limited ability of the island-state to support 
multiple such industries. Strategic Thrust 5 attempted to achieve this by creating an environment conducive to 
the emergence and growth of such niches, and through the identification and development of industry clusters 
within which these competitive niches could evolve. The clusters selected for priority development included 
commodity trading, shipping, precision engineering, electronics, information technology, petrochemical, 
construction, heavy engineering, finance, insurance, general supporting industries, tourism, international hubs, 
and other domestic industries, with investment in the necessary core capabilities and/or incentives to 
accelerate development to be provided by the government. This was to be supported by Strategic Thrust 6, 
the spearheading of economic redevelopment of the economy outside the key industry clusters, which was 
lagging behind, through such methods as the creation of strategic alliances among local companies to exploit 
scale economies and synergise said companies, and the free dissemination of relevant market information to 
the same. 
 
Enhancing Economic Resilience 
Drawing on the lessons from the 1985-86 recession, the Singapore government placed renewed emphasis in 
improving the island-state’s capacity to withstand uncertainties in the international economy, as well as the 
periodic adjustments necessary to keep the SEP on track. Any erosion of international competitiveness could 
well have led to another such recession; thus Strategic Thrust 7, which aimed to heighten awareness of the 
need to monitor Singapore’s competitiveness, by putting in place improved indicators of short-, medium- and 
long-term competitiveness. Singapore’s high dependence on international business for both domestic 
investment and employment, as well as for overseas markets, was also identified as a possible weakness, 
given its small, open economy; Strategic Thrust 8 was to attempt to reduce this vulnerability through a limited 
diversification effort, one which, on one hand, attempted to encourage multinationals to treat Singapore as a 
home base, and on the other, attempted to accelerate the development of promising local enterprises (PLEs). 
The former was to be achieved through strengthening ‘home base’ characteristics as defined by Porter (1990). 
Strategies such as the promotion of more sophisticated technical functions, and of regional marketing 
functions, and the active encouragement of multinationals to identify with the ‘made in Singapore’ label, and of 
top management to ‘localise’ by employing more locals, were set in place. This, however, was constrained by 
the objectives of said multinationals, and by social and political sensitivities relating to their home countries. By 
contrast, the development plans for PLEs that were to achieve the latter objective faced fewer constraints; 
more meaningful support was now to be provided, specifically, a more positive mindset on the part of 
government agencies in assisting local enterprises to compete for contracts, and an intensified effort by 
relevant agencies to reach out to local enterprises and accelerate their growth.  
 
Singapore Unlimited (1995) 
 
Singapore's strategic intent evolved in tandem with the impressive economic performance achieved in early 
1990s. The time frame for joining the first league of developed nations was shortened, albeit on a moving 
target basis, to 2000. This enhanced vision was succinctly spelt out in the document, Singapore Unlimited: 
 
 "Singapore will become a Global City with Total Business Capabilities. It will become an 
international hub for high value-added businesses and a flourishing international centre for 
culture and the arts. Its manufacturing sector will be re-defined by highly profitable industry 
clusters. It will have a highly skilled and educated workforce. Singapore will become an 
Intelligent Island, a global centre of excellence for science and technology, a high value 
location for production and a critical strategic node in global networks of commerce, 
communications and information." (SEDB, 1995a, p.4). 
 
New strategic programs were put in place to hone Singapore's capabilities profile, and to realise its vision of 
becoming a first-league developed nation by the turn of the century. An overview of these strategic programs 
is set out in Table 2. 
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Manufacturing 2000 Programmes (M2000) 
Continuing the Singapore government’s emphasis on the island-state’s manufacturing sector, M2000 
formulated action plans – using the cluster development approach – for major sectors, including aerospace, 
petrochemicals, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, electronics, heavy, precision, and marine engineering, and 
light industries. Using value chain analysis, M2000 identified capability gaps in existing industry clusters and 
proposed new strategic initiatives to close these gaps, among them specific R&D activities and the strategic 
upgrading of supporting services; this was envisaged to bring about lower total landed costs of final products. 
The programme also focused on the manufacturing of key modules in Singapore, for assembly into end-
products in target markets; a combination of strategies that aimed to enable Singapore-based companies to 
leverage resources, and markets, in regional economies, while upgrading the manufacturing capabilities of 
regional sites. (Appendix: Figure 1) With a total of S$3 billion committed by the Singapore government to two 
separate funds (the Cluster Development Fund and Research & Development Fund), and with the supporting 
National Technology Plan and National Information Technology Plan in place, it was sufficiently obvious that at 
this point in time, manufacturing was still very much seen to be a mainstay of Singapore’s growth. 
 
International Business Hub 2000 Programme (IBH2000) 
The island-state, however, had no intention of remaining completely reliant on its manufacturing sector. The 
IBH2000 programme aimed to develop services as a twin pillar of the Singapore economy; seeking to make 
Singapore more attractive for investors in such service-related industries as the financial, communications, 
and technology sectors. (Appendix: Figures 2 to 5) This was to serve two main purposes; to enhance 
Singapore’s role as an economic hub in the Asia-Pacific region, and to bring resources and markets in service 
industries such as finance and information to Singapore’s doorstep. Under this programme, a broad-based 
supportive infrastructure (both hard and soft) was developed to enhance Singapore’s ability as an interface for 
outward investments into the region; configured mainly to complement, and give impetus to, another major 
aspect of Singapore Unlimited, Singapore’s regionalization efforts.  
 
Local Enterprise 2000 Programme (LE2000) 
Efforts to establish a Singaporean presence in the MNC pool also continued, with the LE2000 programme, 
structured to build up local enterprises to support, and become key players, in the M2000, IBH2000 and 
R2000 programmes. These enterprises were encouraged to adopt strategic growth plans, develop new 
capabilities and products, and regionalise their operations; very much in line with the other three programmes 
under Singapore Unlimited. The Singapore government put together a comprehensive, multi-agency 
administered package of initiatives to enhance the MNC-local enterprise nexus (Appendix: Figure 6); the 
ultimate aim being to nurture promising local enterprises into home-grown Asian MNCs (SEDB, 1993b, 1993c; 
1995a). 
 
Regionalization 2000 Programme (R2000) 
In what would come to be known as one of the more significant economic policy decisions made by 
Singapore, the R2000 programme focused on developing Singapore’s external economy (or, ‘second wing’) 
by tapping on the dynamism of other Asia-Pacific economies. The strategic intent of the programme was to 
create the external economic space for local and Singapore-based multinationals to redistribute their 
resource-dependent operations, while upgrading their operations in Singapore to higher-end activities which 
require Singapore's unique set of competencies. A continuation of the transborder cluster development 
approach discussed earlier, this variation of the ‘shakkei’ approach allowed regional sites to leverage on each 
others' resources, technology and markets; ensuring that the development of regional economies, and sites, 
would lead to positive complementary growth for Singapore. 
  
The strategic thrust of R2000 was the establishment of flagship projects in the region, to create a Singapore-
styled business environment in emerging economies for local companies and Singapore-based MNCs (Perry 
and Yeoh, 2000). The Singapore Inc. approach was adopted here (Zutshi & Gibbons, 1998; Okposin, 1999); 
the Singapore government taking the strategic initiative to identify and develop provinces and sites in the 
region, and to use these Singapore-developed sites as locations to access resources and markets. These 
regional sites, when developed, were to enhance Singapore's own competitiveness as a high-value 
investment site with strategic linkages with the region, as well as the competitiveness of Singapore-based 
companies that re-distributed resource-dependent operations to these sites. At the same time, Singapore was 
to lend its competitive strengths (e.g. core competencies in infrastructural development and management) to 
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these regional sites to enhance their competitiveness. The government-to-government project to develop an 
integrated industrial township in Suzhou Province in China – the now well-known Suzhou Industrial Park (SIP) 
– was in many ways the exemplar of this initiative. In other instances, the Singapore government was to have 
taken on the role of a "business architect" and "knowledge arbitrageur"; identifying business opportunities, and 
bringing together the private sector and commercial segments of the public sector in Singapore with foreign 
companies with specific competencies to undertake large-scale investment projects in the region. Examples of 
this mode of regionalization can be seen from the consortia developing the Batam Industrial Park, Bintan 
Industrial Estate, Bintan Beach International Resort, Karimun Industrial Complex in Indonesia (Yeoh, et al, 
1992), the Wuxi-Singapore Industrial Park in China, the Bangalore IT Park in India, and the Vietnam-
Singapore Industrial Park (Yeoh, et al, 2004)  
 
R2000 was to have positioned Singapore as a value-adding bridge for private sector-led regionalization; 
broad-based government-to-government agreements, as well as substantial incentives, grants, and loans 
were made available to facilitate these strategic alliances, and it was envisioned that Singapore's local 
companies, with their regional know-how (including the ever-nebulous ‘guanxi’) would be able to add value to 
Western companies venturing into the region. The eventual fortunes of the SIP – and, indeed, the other 
industrial parks – have been well-documented. These R2000 projects, while certainly successful in a qualified 
way, have met with unforeseen difficulties, not the least of which, was the occasional incompatibility of 
Singapore’s vaunted regional know-how with actual socio-political realities in the partnering countries, and the 
general failure of Singapore businessmen to adapt readily to said realities. This, along with other events 
(discussed in the next section), was to place into the spotlight the need for adaptation and innovation in 
Singapore.  
 
Remaking Singapore (2001 to present) 
 
Singapore’s economic growth barrelled ahead through most of the 1990s. By 2000, however, clouds began to 
appear on the horizon. The impact of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the emergence of China as Asia’s 
new economic powerhouse had relegated Southeast Asia to a second-choice destination for many foreign 
investors. In 2000, Southeast Asia only absorbed about 10% of foreign investment in Asia, down from the 
commanding 60% it once absorbed in the early 1990s. China, in the meantime, leaped from 20% to 30%, with 
the remainder flowing mostly to Northeast Asia. Already MNEs were showing a distinct attraction towards 
China’s huge domestic market and lower costs; and technologically, too, China was catching up to the rest of 
the world – and to Singapore – at an exponential rate. As one senior economist at JP Morgan & Chase 
Singapore puts it, ‘China [was] catching up faster than Singapore [was] leaping ahead’; as were, indeed, India 
and other rapidly developing potential economic superpowers. Singapore’s regionalization drive proved 
prescient, allowing the island-state to prosper from rapid economic development in China, India, and others. 
However, these developments underlined a central weakness of Singapore’s economy; a lack of, as Mr Lee 
Kwan Yew, then Senior Minister of Singapore, put it, ‘entrepreneurial talent’. Adaptability and innovation were 
the new elements of long-term economic survival and prosperity; elements, it was felt, Singapore was severely 
lacking in. Mr Lee candidly summarized the situation: 
 
"We have to start experimenting. The easy things - just getting a blank mind to take in 
knowledge and become trainable - we have done. Now comes the difficult part. To get 
literate and numerate minds to be more innovative, to be more productive, that's not 
easy. It requires a mind-set change, a different set of values." (Institutional Investor, Jun 
2002). 
 
In December 2001, therefore, an Economic Review Committee was given the task of drawing up a blueprint 
for the ‘new Singapore’ (MTI, 2003a). Simultaneously, a ‘Remaking Singapore’ Committee was convened for 
the purpose of exploring the social and political changes associated with and/or required to achieve the aims 
of the ERC. Together, the two committees proposed a series of recommendations and initiatives which aimed 
to, through not just the economic, but also the political and social dimensions, foster higher quality of service 
and a greater degree of diversity and entrepreneurship, without losing the efficiency and orderliness that have 
been the cornerstone of Singapore’s growth for decades. The vision proposed by ‘Remaking Singapore’ was, 
quite mellifluously, this: 
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“…a leading global city, a hub of talent, enterprise and innovation. Singapore will 
become the most open and cosmopolitan city in Asia, and one of the best places to live 
and work. In another decade and a half, Singapore will connect China, India and 
Southeast Asia, and beyond. We will become an Asian centre of choice for global 
talent, attracting skilled technicians, managers, entrepreneurs and creative people from 
all over the world. We will be a creative and innovative society, always eager to try out 
new ideas and change for the better, with a culture that respects achievement in the 
sciences and the arts.” 
(Economic Review Committee Report, Executive Summary, p. 5) 
 
Taken holistically, then, the economic dimensions of the strategic thrusts under the Remaking Singapore 
program can be broadly classified into three areas: 
 
Quality and a Global Reputation 
In one sense, Remaking Singapore aims to complete a paradigm shift that has been constant throughout all of 
the island-state’s previous economic strategies, viz, the move away from simple efficiency, towards an overall 
higher standard of service – to focus on quality, instead of quantity. Under Remaking Singapore, however, the 
Singapore government aims to go one step further; to build a global reputation for being a world leader in 
various industries. Among the areas of focus are healthcare – Singapore being already a popular destination 
for upmarket health care – and academic services, with several top American and European universities 
offering courses jointly with local colleges or with mini-campuses in Singapore. Through creating this 
reputation, Singapore hopes to create a culture of quality, one that will constantly allow it to improve itself, and 
one through which it will be known; a combination of adaptability and advertisement. 
 
Several social initiatives are at the fore of Remaking Singapore’s efforts to create this global reputation. 
Education is now to be promoted as a lifelong process, a continuous journey of self-improvement and 
adaptation; a journey which, it is hoped, will lead to the greater degree of vibrance and innovation needed to 
achieve the continuously self-improving high standard of quality Remaking Singapore aims to achieve. In line 
with the global element, two other initiatives stress, separately, the importance of integrating ‘new 
Singaporeans’ – i.e. foreign talent – into Singapore society, to generate a free flow of talent into Singapore that 
will help to keep the island-state constantly at the forefront of technological developments; and the 
development of ‘a global network of Singaporeans’ through the impression of a greater sense of national 
identity, and allowing greater representation of foreign-based Singaporeans, among others – this for the 
purpose of replacing the much-discussed ‘brain drain’ with ‘a brain circulation’, with Singapore’s many foreign-
bound professionals becoming, instead of ‘quitters’, ambassadors of a sort; spreading Singapore’s influence, 
and reputation, wherever they go. 
 
Encouragement of Greater Diversity 
This enhancement in quality and development of a global reputation, however, is quite clearly not limited to 
Singapore’s traditional financial and manufacturing powerhouses. One of Remaking Singapore’s main goals is 
to encourage a greater diversity in both individual talents, and in collective choices of industries; more 
specifically, for the latter, in the fields of ‘exportable services’, such as healthcare, education, biomedical 
services, financial services, and even the arts. This move, needless to say, represents a huge shift from the 
hitherto single-concentration tendency of Singapore’s economic strategy, which saw periods of intense 
development in individual ‘hot’ industries. The idea behind this is to encourage diversification and, therefore, a 
culture both less reliant on any one industry, and more used to adapting to and innovating in any and all new 
industries, or even creating new industries of its own – both advantageous factors for an economy’s long-term 
growth and relevancy. 
 
Greater encouragement of alternative careers in general, as well as individual programs designed to promote 
so-called ‘niche’ industries such as the arts are amongst the main strategies employed by Remaking 
Singapore at the industry level. At the social level, a host of mainly education-oriented initiatives have been, or 
are to be, undertaken to change the system to one more friendly towards those with talents other than the 
traditional knowledge-based; to harness and nurture the diverse talents that will serve to diversify Singapore’s 
economy in the future. Several of these initiatives include the creation of national arts and sports schools, and 
the introduction of integrated programs that conduct the entire education process for students under them. 
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Most significantly, perhaps, one of the strategies outlined in the policy document (MTI, 2003b) is to ‘broaden 
the definition of success’, to change the collective social mindset to one where it is recognized that people 
choose their own yardsticks of success. This, to be sure, is a revolutionary social move for the historically 
achievement-driven island-state indeed. 
 
Nurturing the Entrepreneurial Spirit 
Even in the two above areas, it should be quite evident that the ultimate aim of Remaking Singapore is, of 
course, to nurture the ‘spirit of entrepreneurship’ which the Singapore government admits the city-state tends 
to lack. A large number of the strategic thrusts of Remaking Singapore are aimed, directly or indirectly, at 
addressing this lack; the abovementioned ‘harnessing of diversity in talent’ has a clear element of revising the 
traditionally achievement-driven social structure, and other initiatives under the program aim to encourage 
participation by Singaporeans, and to enlarge space for free expression and for experimentation – largely by 
relaxing a significant number of the many rules placed on such activities in the first place. 
 
As noted in the previous sections, however, this is not the first time the Singapore government has attempted 
to spark greater creativity by relaxing regulations; all previous attempts, though, met with limited success. A 
study by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (Wong, et al, 2003) offers the conclusion that, in Singapore’s 
case, the greatest barrier was never antipathetic regulation, but rather an unsupportive culture, one less than 
tolerant of failure and overly satisfied with maintaining the status quo. Under the Remaking Singapore 
program, the Singapore government attempts to address this by a broad social initiative to promote a more 
gracious, compassionate, and cohesive society; to gradually change social mindsets to be more accepting as 
well as more adventurous, both through a wide range of programs designed to change the perceptions of the 
general public through inundation, and by example. Many of the initiatives mentioned previously also fulfil this 
purpose; changing the education system to ‘broaden the definition of success’ is clearly a key initiative towards 
achieving this, as is the greater integration and acceptance of overseas Singaporeans. These initiatives, 
however, are most definitely for the long-term – while signs are cautiously promising, only time will tell how 
successful this proves to be in changing the mindsets of Singaporeans. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Singapore is, once again, at a crossroads in its economic development. The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
exposed structural strains in the economy which had been masked by prior economic growth; more recent 
events and the rise of China have highlighted a fundamental lack of innovative and entrepreneurial 
capability in the island-state’s economy. Through the years, Singapore has re-positioned itself to add depths 
on research and development in niche sectors, and enhanced its industrial and technological base; through 
its cluster development industrial strategy and ‘enterprise ecosystem’ efforts at building an international 
business hub, Singapore provides a stable and pro-business environment, first-rate infrastructure and high 
quality workforce for businesses, as well as quality of life and standard of living for executives. To maintain 
this, however, the island-state must now improve its innovative and adaptive capabilities; the last step, 
perhaps, towards achieving its vision of being a premier hub for headquarter activities, with a strong network 
of business support linkages and global connectivity. The fundamental changes that will be required to 
achieve this, however, will not be easily implemented. 
  
Singapore's current success, however, is a testimony of a nation's determined efforts at strategic management 
for economic development. Singapore's achievements are the outcome of the unique combination of strategic 
forecasting and planning, and the strategic implementation of appropriate strategies in an ever changing, and 
competitive, global environment. Adaptability, it seems, is not something which the island-state lacks on the 
national level; the challenge before it now, then, is to apply that adaptability to, so to speak, changing mindsets 
of Singaporeans, to promote greater innovation and entrepreneurial capability. The signs in this direction are 
fairly positive – the eventual results, however, are not yet obvious. One thing, however, is for certain; that the 
socio-economic and socio-political changes, and challenges, in the global environment leave no room for 
complacency. Like a chess player, Singapore must plan – and stay – several steps ahead of the competition. 
 
 
  
 
9 
  
REFERENCES 
 
Huff, W. (1995). The development state, Singapore, and Singapore’s economic development since 1960, 
World Development, 23(8): 1421-1438. 
 
Krause, L. (1987). Thinking about Singapore. In L. Krause et al. (Eds), The Singapore Economy 
Reconsidered (pp.1-21). Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
 
Lim, C.Y.  and Associates (1988). Policy Options for the Singapore Economy.  Singapore: McGraw Hill. 
 
Low, L. (1998). The Political Economy of a City-State: Government Made Singapore. Singapore: Times 
Academic Press. 
 
Mahizhnan, A. (1994). Developing Singapore’s external economy. In Southeast Asian Affairs 1994 (pp.285-
301). Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
 
Mirza, H. (1986).Multinationals and the Growth of the Singapore Economy. London: Croom Helm. 
 
Murray, G. and Pereira, A. (1995). Singapore: The Global City-state. London: Heinemann. 
 
Okposin, S.M. (1999). The Extent of Singapore’s Investment Abroad. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
 
Pang, E.F. (1987) Foreign investment and the state In Singapore. In V. Cable and B. Persaud (Eds.), 
Developing with Foreign Investment (pp. 84-100). London: Croom Helm. 
 
______. (1995). Staying global and going regional: Singapore’s inward and outward direct investments. In 
Nomura Research Institute, The New Wave of FDI in Asia (pp.111-129). Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asia Studies and Nomura Research Institute. 
 
Peebles and Wilson (1996). The Singapore Economy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Pereira, A. (2000). State collaboration with transnational corporations: the case of Singapore’s industrial 
programs (1965-1999), Competition and Change, 4(4):1-29. 
 
Perry, M. (1995). New corporate structures, regional offices and Singapore's new economic directions, 
Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 16(2): 181-196. 
 
______. and Yeoh, C. (2000). Asia's transborder industrialization and Singapore's overseas industrial parks, 
Regional Studies, 4(2): 199-206. 
 
Regnier, P. (1991). Singapore: City State in Southeast Asia. London: Hurst & Company. 
 
______. (1993). Spreading Singapore’s wings worldwide: A review of traditional investment strategies, The 
Pacific Review, 6: 305-312. 
 
Rodan, G. (1989). The Political Economy of Singapore's Industrialization. London: Macmillan. 
 
Singapore Economic Development Board. (1988). Global strategies - The Singapore Partnership 
(Conference Proceedings, October 24-26). 
 
______. (1990). Global Strategies - World Class Partnership (Conference Proceedings, June 4-6). 
 
______. (1992). Singapore: A Base for MNC's Regional Headquarters in Asia. 
 
______. (1993a). Regionalization Forum (Conference Proceedings, May 21-23) 
 
  
 
10 
  
______. (1993b). Growing with Enterprise: A National Effort. 
 
______. (1993c). Your Partners in Regionalization: Singapore Government Agencies. 
 
______. (1995a). Singapore Unlimited. 
 
______. (1995b). Regionalization 2000. 
 
Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry. (1981). Highlights of Singapore's Economic Development Plan for 
the Eighties. 
 
______. (1986). Report of the Economic Committee. 
 
______. (1991). The Strategic Economic Plan - Towards a Developed Nation. 
 
______. (2003a). Report of the Economic Review Committee. 
 
______. (2003b). Report of the Remaking Singapore Committee: Changing Mindsets, Deepening 
Relationships 
 
Wong, P.K., Wong, F., Ho, Y.P. Singh, A. and Lee, L. (2003). Global Entrepreneurship Monitor. Singapore: 
National University of Singapore Entrepreneurship Centre. 
 
Yeoh, C. (1988). Industrial restructuring in an Asian newly industrialising country: Singapore's response to a 
changing world, unpublished D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford. 
 
______, Goh, M., Lau, G and Richardson, J. (1992). Strategic Business Opportunities in the Growth Triangle. 
Singapore: Longman. 
 
______, Cai, J. and Koh, C.S. (2004). Singapore’s regionalization blueprint: a case of strategic 
management, state enterprise network and selective intervention. Journal of Transnational Management 
Development, 9(4): forthcoming. 
 
Yeung, H. (1998). The political economy of transnational corporations: A study of the regionalization of 
Singaporean firms, Political Geography, 17(4): 389-416. 
 
Zutshi, R.K. and Gibbons, P.T. (1998). The internationalization process of Singapore government-linked 
companies: A contextual view. Asia-Pacific Journal of Management, 15(2), 219-246. 
 
  
 
11 
  
 
 TABLE 1 
 Strategic Economic Plan: Strategic Thrusts for the 1990s 
 
 Strategy  Programs To be 
implemente
d by year 
Co-ordinating 
agencies 
Enhance human 
resources 
Implement international manpower programs  1992 EDB 
Promote national 
teamwork 
Establish MTI Economic Panel  1992 MTI 
Develop international 
orientation 
 
Get Singaporeans to work abroad 
Promote Growth Triangle 
and regional alliances 
Develop information infrastructure 
internationally and at home 
 1993 
 1993 
 
 1993 
 EDB 
 EDB 
 
 NCB 
 
Create innovation-
oriented climate 
Review government rules  1992  NPB 
 
Develop industry and 
service clusters 
 
Implement cluster-based development plans 
Hold cluster workshops 
Improve employer-employee ties 
Improve labour supply and demand situation 
 1992 
 1992 
 1992 
 1992 
 Cluster 
 agencies 
  MOL 
MTI 
Redevelop domestic 
industries and services 
Set up multi-agency taskforce  1992  EDB/NPB 
 
Maintain international 
competitiveness 
Form competitiveness monitoring groups  1991  MTI 
Reduce vulnerability 
 
 
Form scenario analysis group 
Inculcate positive mindset in government 
agencies towards local firms 
Review institutional support for local firms 
Identify and monitor medium and long-term 
economic performance indicators 
Encourage multinational firms to 
set up home base in Singapore 
 1992 
 1992 
 
 1992 
 1992 
 
 1993 
 MTI 
 EDB 
 
 EDB 
 MTI 
 
 Cluster 
       agencies 
    Notes 
    NCB: National Computer Board 
    NPB: National Productivity Board 
    MOL: Ministry of Labour 
  
Source: Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry 
Strategic Economic Plan, 1991. 
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 Table 2 
Singapore Unlimited: An Overview 
 
 Program  Strategic Intent  Government Assistance 
Manufacturing 2000 
 
 
Manufacturing and ... 
To sustain the manufacturing sector's contribution 
to Singapore's economy at more than 25% of GDP, 
and employment share at more than 20%. 
 
Technology 
To achieve R&D spending of 2% of GDP in the medium and long 
term. 
 
Cluster Development Fund 
Research & Development Fund 
Tax incentives 
Research Incentive Scheme for Companies  
Product & Process Development Assistance Scheme 
Research & Development Assistance Scheme 
Technology Development Fund 
R&D Incubator Program 
International Business Hub 2000 
 
 
 
 
Trade and communications 
To develop Singapore as a premier international trade 
and communications hub, and a global gateway for goods, 
services, people and information. 
 
Tourism and lifestyle 
To enhance Singapore's economic development 
and to improve the quality of life of Singaporeans 
by positioning the republic as an attractive tourist destination, 
a tourism business centre, and a tourism hub in Asia 
with a vibrant tourism and lifestyle industry. 
 
Headquarters and business services 
Tax incentives 
Operational Headquarters (OHQs) 
Approved Royalties 
Approved Foreign Loan Scheme 
Export of Services Incentive 
Warehousing and Servicing Incentive 
 
Trade and communications 
Approved International Trader 
Approved Oil Trader 
Approved International Fair 
Approved International Shipping Enterprise 
Aircraft Licensing Scheme 
 
Tourism and lifestyle 
A comprehensive package of incentives is being put together under 
the National Tourism Plan framework. 
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 Table 2 (continued) 
 Singapore Unlimited: An Overview 
 
 Program  Strategic Intent  Government Assistance 
Local Enterprise 2000 
 
 
To develop an internationally competitive local enterprise sector 
by improving the performance of local small and medium-sized 
enterprises. 
 
To nurture promising local enterprises (PLEs) 
in the manufacturing and services sectors 
to achieve a target of 100 companies with 
at least $100 million in sales turnover in the next 10 years.  
 
Broad-based assistance: 
more than 60 government development assistance schemes 
(EDB (1993c), p.23) 
  
Industry-level assistance 
(e.g. infrastructural support, cluster development, etc) 
 
Focused assistance 
(i.e. nurturing PLEs to become home-grown Asian MNCs) 
 
Regionalization 2000 
 
 
 
 
To increase GNP through Singapore based companies 
participating in the dynamic growth of the region. 
 
To increase GDP through economic spin-offs 
derived from overseas investments to the domestic economy. 
 
Business Development Scheme  
Cluster Development Fund 
Double tax deduction 
 (overseas investment development expenditure) 
Franchise Development Assistance Scheme 
Local Enterprise Finance Scheme (overseas) 
Market and Investment Development 
 Assistance Scheme 
Overseas Enterprise Incentive 
Overseas Investment Tax Incentive 
Regionalization Training Scheme 
Regional Venture Funds Incentive 
 
 
 Sources: Economic Development Board 
 Yearbook, 1994 and Singapore Unlimited, 1995
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Table 3 
Remaking Singapore: An Overview 
 
 Theme Strategic Thrusts 
A Home For All Singaporeans 
 
 
Enhancing Identification With The Ideals Of The Nation 
Strengthening Cohesion Between People Of Different Races, 
Languages And Religions 
Enhancing Our Ability To Integrate New Singaporeans 
Developing Global Networks of Singaporeans 
Education – Harnessing Diversity In Talent 
 
 
A Home Owned 
 
 
 
 
Enlarging Space For Expression and Experimentation 
Encouraging Participation 
A Home For All Seasons A Gracious, Compassionate and Cohesive Society 
Enabling the Full Participation of All Segments of Society 
 
 
A Home To Cherish Promoting Equal Opportunities 
Strengthening Families As The First Line of Support 
Preserving Memories, Building Shared History 
Improving the Environment For Participation and Fun 
 
 
 
Source: Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry 
Remaking Singapore: Changing Minds, Deepening Relationships (2003) 
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Figure 1     Figure 2 
 
Figure 3     Figure 4 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5     Figure 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
